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CoNSTITt.mONAL LAW-GRAND JURY UNDER THE F1FrH AMENDMENT-
INDICTMENTS Nor SUBJECT To ATIACK ON EvmENTIARY GROUNDS-Defend-
ant was indicted by a grand jury on four counts of willfully evading federal 
income taxes due for the years 1946, 1947, 1948 and 1949.1 His motion 
1 The indictment was based on I.R.C. (1939), §145 (b). 
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before trial to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he was firmly 
convinced that there could have been no legal or competent evidence 
before the grand jury was denied by the trial court. At the conclusion 
of the government's case, and again just before the case went to the 
jury, counsel for the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the 
ground that only hearsay evidence offered by three revenue agents had 
been presented to the grand jury. 2 The court denied the motions, and 
defendant was convicted on three of the four counts of the indictment. 
On appeal the Second Circuit affirmed on two of the counts, holding that 
hearsay evidence alone is enough to support a grand jury indictment. 8 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the single question: 
"May a defendant be required to stand trial and a conviction be sustained 
where only hearsay evidence was presented to the grand jury which in-
dicted him?"4 Held, an indictment returned by a legally constituted and 
unbiased grand jury is not open to challenge on the ground that it is 
not supported by adequate or competent evidence. Costello v. United 
States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956). 
Historically, the grand jury has never been restricted in its pro-
ceedings by the rules of evidence which prevail during the trial of a 
criminal case.5 Proof that hearsay or other incompetent testimony was 
presented to the grand jury has not generally been· considered sufficient 
grounds for ·quashing an indictment.6 The holding in the principal 
case carries this principle to its logical extreme, • for if incompetent 
evidence is to be admitted at all, it follows that it should suffice of it-
self to sustain an indictment, since no one but the grand jurors them-
selves could ever know what evidence convinced them of the probable 
2 At the trial the government employed the "net worth" method as a means of 
proving that the defendant had received more income during the years in question than 
he reported. This method of proof involves the establishment of a figure which repre• 
sents the taxpayer's net worth at the beginning of the period in question. Evidence of 
purchases and business transactions of the taxpayer during the period is then offered 
with a view toward fixing the amount of the taxpayer's expenditures during the period. 
Finally, the net worth of the taxpayer at the end of the period is determined. The differ-
ence between the opening net worth figure and the sum of the proven expenditures 
plus the closing net worth figure is assumed to approximate the income of the tax-
payer during the period. See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 12.1 (1954). Each govern-
ment witness was asked by defendant's counsel if he had appeared before the grand 
jury. Only the three revenue agents gave affirmative replies. They were allowed to 
summarize at the end of the government's case the evidence already presented, and to 
introduce computations showing that if the evidence presented was correct, defendant 
had received far more income than he· reported. Such summaries and computations are 
a type of hearsay evidence permitted in "net worth" cases once the jury has heard the 
direct evidence which forms the basis of the computations. 
3 United States v. Costello, (2d Cir. 1955) 221 F. (2d) 668, noted in 65 YALE L. J. 
390 (1956). 
4 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 819 (1955). 
51 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 323 (1922); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 
3d ed., 19 (1940). 
6 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); McGregor v. United States, (4th Cir. 
1904) 134 F. 187; Chadwick v. United States, (6th Cir. 1905) 141 F. 225. 
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guilt of the accused.7 Granting that it is desirable to free grand juries 
generally from the technical rules of evidence, the present holding raises 
some basic questions of policy. The provision of the Fifth Amend-
ment which guarantees that no one shall be required to answer, in 
the federal courts, for a "capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury,"8 was inserted in 
the Bill of Rights as a safeguard against malicious and unfounded 
prosecutions.0 If the proceedings of grand juries were not subject to 
judicial review at all, the provision would be of little value in this 
regard. By confining the scope of such review to questions of bias 
and irregular impaneling, the court has significantly reduced the amount 
of protection against unjustified prosecutions which the Fifth Amend-
ment was designed to provide. A grand jury which returned an indictment 
without having heard any evidence of probative value "would have in sub-
stance abdicated,"10 but under the rule announced in the principal case no 
motion to quash could be heard unless accompanied by evidence that the 
grand jury was biased or illegally constituted. The reason for the extreme 
position taken by the court lies in the delay incident to granting motions to 
review the minutes of the grand jury proceedings.11 When such a mo-
tion is granted, the trial judge must, prior to the actual trial of the 
case, re-do the work of the grand jury by reviewing all the evidence 
which appeared before it.12 The court's determination that the good to 
be gained by the elimination of this administrative problem outweighed 
the evil involved in forcing an occasional person to stand trial on an in-
dictment unsupported by any evidence having probative value seems open to 
question. 
Jerome K. Walsh, Jr., S. Ed. 
7 But see Nanfito v. United States, (8th Cir. 1927) 20 F. (2d) 376; Brady v. United 
States, (8th Cir. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 405, holding that an indictment should be quashed if no 
competent evidence tending to establish guilt was heard by the grand jury. 
8 U.S. CONST., Amend. V. 
9 Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 at 426 (1885); United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 
433 (1922). 
10 Judge Learned Hand, in United States v. Costello, (2d Cir. 1955) 221 F. (2d) 
668 at 677. 
11 Principal case at 363. 
12 United States v. Fitzgerald, (E.D. Pa. 1928) 29 F. (2d) 573 at 576. See also 62 
HARV. L. REv. 111 at 115 (1948). 
